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Notes
The Waiting Is the Hardest Part: DOES LONGER
PATENT PENDENCY MEAN MORE VALUABLE
PATENTS?
Michael P. Ellenberger
ABSTRACT—The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
is one of the busiest—and slowest—patent offices in the world. The
average utility patent is pending for 25.3 months before issuance. For parties
that require legal protections in fast-moving technological fields, such as
mobile technology startup, the waiting could be detrimental. Moreover, the
patent backlog problems worldwide cost the global economy over $10
billion per year. Even under such a delay, an increasing number of issued
patents are threatened or invalidated in the U.S. court system.
Undoubtedly, then, if patents are considered to have “quality” only if
they are both (a) valid and (b) litigation-proof, the USPTO is failing. If,
however, instead the consideration is broadened as to what it means for a
patent to be “high quality”— using the four “patent worth considerations” of
market, signal, impact, and reputational value—then the situation looks far
from disastrous. This note proposes to examine the time-value dynamic of a
patent and evaluate whether, in consideration of a variety of metrics, longpending patents are more valuable. In short, are patents worth the wait?
This note concludes with proposals for a more efficient Patent Office
through examination of existing functional policies both internal to the
USPTO and abroad.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is one of the
busiest patent offices in the world, fielding approximately 500,000 newlyfiled utility applications annually, and receiving more certified mail per day
than any other single entity.1 At such a volume, the time from application
filing to issuance is long. Owing to a myriad of factors, the average pendency
period in the United States is 25.3 months and can be as long as twenty-eight
months for “Networks, Multiplexing, Cable, and Security,” a burgeoning and
crowded art space.2
Patent pendency is frustrating for the impatient but potentially lethal for
the startup.3 A recent report from the UK Intellectual Property Office
estimated that the “combined losses from each year of backlog in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Japan Patent Office, and the European Patent
1 Iain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent Characteristics, and
Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 19, 23 (Wesley M. Cohen and
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (“The USPTO is one of the earliest and among the most visible agencies
of the federal government, receiving more certified mail per day than any other single organization in the
world.”); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application
Data, 99 REV. ECON. STAT. 550, 552 (2016) (“Each year between 300,000 and 500,000 patent
applications are filed at the Patent Office.”).
2 U.S. P ATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, P ERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR 2016, at 180 (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY16PAR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M6RA-3HA2] [hereinafter PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
3 MARK SCHULTZ & KEVIN MADIGAN, THE LONG WAIT FOR INNOVATION: THE GLOBAL P ATENT
PENDENCY PROBLEM 3 (2016).
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Office [combined] costs the global economy over $10 billion a year.”4 While
the pendency brings the costs of lost revenue, it does not necessarily impact
the quality of the applications across four classifications: market value,
signal, impact, and reputational considerations.
Compared with the bifurcated search and examination stages before the
European Patent Office (EPO), the USPTO consolidates the two steps into
one, increasing complexity and stress on examiners in their limited allotted
time and incorporating additional sources of error.5 Research suggests that
the time allotted to each examiner per patent, absent the already inherent
intellectual rigor of the position, induces examiners to grant invalid patents
already “on the margin.”6 Coupled with a backlog of a half million patents
still awaiting examination, the incentives for an examiner to rush through an
application and render a quick, rather than quality, decision is all too high.7
Moreover, the view that disclosure-for-monopoly rights is the driving
force for patent law in the United States is a faulty “simple view” of
intellectual property rights, and one wherein “inventors should be loath to
disclose any more information than necessary to obtain patent protection.”8
Mere patent protection provides insufficient incentive for a complete
disclosure: such an arrangement is too weak to drive the engine of patent
law. There must be more.
Undoubtedly, if patents are considered to have “quality” only if they
are both (a) valid and (b) litigation-proof, then the USPTO is failing. Patents
are continually challenged, overruled, or invalidated before district courts,
the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB), the Federal Circuit, and the
Supreme Court. If instead the consideration is broadened as to what it means
for a patent to be “high quality”—if the introduction of patent signaling,
reputation, or minor, readily implementable tweaks to the Patent Office are
allowed to hold worth—then the situation looks far from disastrous.
Part I of this note will look at the Patent Office’s function and the factors
that feed into pendency: application backlog, examiner incentives, and rate
of application. Part II will investigate the value-quality-worth dynamics of
patents, and how pendency, while depriving applicants of raw financial gain,
may not inhibit a patent’s value. In doing so, Part II will further develop a
new multifaceted model for patent value. Finally, Part III will consider
4

Id.
Colleen V. Chien & Jay P. Kesan, Comparing Patent Quality at the USPTO and EPO, LAW360
(Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/863111/comparing-patent-quality-at-the-uspto-andepo [https://perma.cc/5BGL-YL55] (reflecting a joint presentation on the subject available within the
article).
6 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 552.
7 Id.
8 Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 626 (2002).
5
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potential improvements to the patent system in the United States,
improvements that will decrease patent pendency without harming patent
value when considering the new paradigm proposed in Part II.
I.

PATENT OFFICE FUNCTION
A. Pendency

The lack of expedited service at the USPTO is largely due to the
substantial number of patents previously filed but not yet examined, a
backlog further exacerbated by the uptick in filings in the 21st century.9 The
USPTO handled 629,647 applications in 2015—including utility (589,410),
design (39,097), and plant (1,140) patent applications.10 325,979 patents
were granted.11 According to the Patent Office’s 2016 Performance and
Accountability Report (PAR), patent applications on average received a first
action within 16.2 months of filing and remained in the Patent Office 25.3
months.12 While the total pendency measure is within the USPTO fiscal year
2016 target, the time to first action—the period it takes an examiner to
determine faults or deficiencies in the filed application—is slower than the
USPTO’s published target of 14.8 months.13
That’s not to say change hasn’t come. At the start of the Obama
Administration in 2009, the USPTO backlog of unexamined patent
applications was about 750,000.14 Driven by USPTO protocol and an
increased awareness of such slog, backlog was cut by over 200,000 in the
2016 fiscal year, a 28% decrease in spite of an annual increase in filings of
almost 4%.15 Along with shortening the backlog, the USPTO has continually
chipped away at pendency, cutting the figure from 25.9 months in January
2009 to 16.2 months in September 2016.16 All of this, says the USPTO,
“means that deserving patented technology can reach consumers at home and
around the world sooner than they would have in the past, further driving
innovation and economic growth.”17

9 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. P ATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
(June 15, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/B38ER367] [hereinafter U.S. Patent Statistics Chart].
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 P ERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
13 Id. at 23–24.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id.; U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, supra note 9.
16 P ERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
17 Id.
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B. International Patent Office Comparisons
The pendency period before the USPTO is on par with its four peer
offices in other countries, collectively comprising the five largest patent
offices (IP5): USPTO, Japanese Patent Office, Korea Patent Office, Chinese
Patent Office, and European Patent Office (EPO).18 In its 2016 Annual
Report, the EPO disclosed that:
For examination, the objective is to progressively reduce the total time for an
examination procedure, from receipt of a request for examination to the
announcement of the intention to grant a patent under Rule 71(3) EPC, to 12
months on average by 2020. As a first step, median examination pendency has
been reduced to 23.3 months. 19

Pendency is coming down across the globe. The other countries in the
IP5 have similar or longer waits (2.8 years in Korea, 2.9 in China, 5.3 in
Japan), but none of the IP5 countries are within striking distance of the one
year goal of the EPO.20 By global standards, however, the offices of the IP5
comprise five of the seven fastest global offices to decision—a far cry from
the ten and 10.1 years of pendency in Thailand and Brazil, respectively. 21
And, while the EPO is quicker to issuance than the USPTO, much of
the disparity is covered in the EPO’s production of a search report, which
advises potential applicants on the patentability and the technological
landscape of their application. The search report takes time to produce,
certainly, but heads off many potential fruitless prosecutions.22 Thus, when
the EPO patent prosecution timeline is adjusted to account for the lapse
between publication of the search report and subsequent examination, “EPO
pendency is actually very similar, at least with respect to recent patents, to
the USPTO pendency.”23
The published search report may be an effective tool for the United
States to counter long pendency. Before the EPO, the publication
discourages investors who have potentially invalid or insignificant
inventions from filing applications frivolously and demanding an examiner’s
18

IP5, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-gettingstarted/international-protection/office-policy-and-international-affairs-ip5
[https://perma.cc/SDF6HJ6A].
19 EUR. P ATENT OFFICE, EPO QUALITY REPORT 2016, at 24 (2016), available at
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/D4D30CF45FD00F51C125814C003C4B0D/$F
ile/epo_quality_report_2016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6BX-CTSD].
20 SCHULTZ & MADIGAN, supra note 3, at 1.
21 Id.
22 L. Petrucci & J. Beatty, Fast and Sure: Options to Quicker Processing Before the EPO, EPI
INFORMATION,
http://information.patentepi.com/4-16/fast-and-sure-options-to-quicker-processingbefore-the-epo/ [https://perma.cc/XDR5-S7FE]; see infra Part III.C.
23 Chien & Kesan, supra note 5.
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time that could go towards examining a more valid patent.24 And despite the
pendency time coming down compared to a decade ago, studies by the
National Bureau of Economic Research found that “the pressure to make
decisions too quickly may be one reason the patent office grants ‘bad’
patents—approving weak applications that never should’ve been granted in
the first place—that allow patent trolls to thrive.”25
The differences don’t end there. Indeed, the rate of opposition at the
EPO is “more than thirty times higher” than the rate of reexamination
domestically.26 Before the EPO, judicial challenges lead to revocations of the
patent or restriction of the patent right in roughly 35% and 33% of the cases,
respectively.27 In the U.S., “re-examination results in a cancellation of the
patent right in only 10 percent of all cases.”28 Since the passage of the
America Invents Act, patent pendency and patent rules have changed
considerably in both jurisdictions, and the U.S. reexamination procedure has
been significantly amended. Still, the idea that stronger patents result from
more rigorous (and lengthier) prosecution assignments is still not welldefined.
C. The Cost of Delay
Patents are hardly the only way innovators can protect their
investments, but they are one of the most prevalent. As will be explored,
patent pendency hurts innovators but may have further ramifications to noninventive society. As patent backlogs continue to linger at major worldwide
patent offices, the stress of pending applications may force an examiner’s
hand into issuing suboptimal patents, which further reverberates throughout
the patent world. As such, pendency can reciprocally harm patent offices in
reputation and revenue.
The USPTO is aware that delays create significant costs to innovators
seeking protection. The result? A limiting of the number of hours an
examiner spends per patent in order to expedite the process.29 As such, the
average patent gets about nineteen hours before an examiner in total,
between researching prior art, drafting rejections and responses, and
24

Id.
Brian Fung, Inside the Stressed-Out, Time-Crunched Patent Examiner Workforce, WASH. POST
(July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/31/inside-the-stressedout-time-crunched-patent-examiner-workforce/ [https://perma.cc/Z5SH-7N45].
26 Stuart J. H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of U.S. Patent Re-examinations
and European Patent Oppositions, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 74, 75 (Wesley
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 75-76.
29 Fung, supra note 25.
25
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interfacing with prosecuting attorneys.30 Plainly, this allotment is
insufficient. Frakes and Wasserman, in their investigation into whether time
pressures placed on examiners force the issuance of bad patents, determined
that “as an examiner is given less time to review an application, the less
active she becomes in searching for prior art, the less likely she becomes to
make obviousness rejections (which are especially time-intensive exercises),
and the more likely she becomes to grant the patent.”31 Regardless of the
quality of the material before them, examiners under time crunches will both
increase obviousness rejections for the sake of time, or simply move for
issuance, even if there are claimed elements that may not fit validity
requirements.
Delays hurt innovators in a number of ways. A study by Joan FarreMensa et al. found that for each year a startup’s application is delayed before
the patent body, the startup’s employment and sales growth are reduced by
21% and 28% respectively over the five years following the eventual
approval.32 Resultantly, long delays at the patent office can disincentivize a
company from innovating or patenting its technologies, stunting not only its
individual progress but also the nation’s technological progress. As Mark
Schultz and Kevin Madigan postulate, the patent office functions somewhat
as a promise to the inventors it serves, a signpost by which a prospective
inventor can buoy itself.33 But “if the patent system is to support local
innovation, then the patent system needs to serve entrepreneurs with speed
and efficiency.”34
Substantial academic effort has been put into understanding the
examiner-patent relationship and the timescale-based promotion mechanism
that plagues examiners. For example, examiners with a certain level of
experience necessarily move to higher General Schedule (GS) pay scales.35
This promotion allows fewer hours per patent, which in turn increases the
likelihood of patent granting.36 More provocatively, if all examiners were
allowed as many hours per patent as an entry level (GS-7) examiner, the

30

Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 553.
Id.
32 Joan Farre-Mensa et al., The Bright Side of Patents 3 (USPTO Econ. Working Paper No. 2015-5
Dec. 15, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729060 [https://perma.cc/CV3A-RJ8N].
33 SCHULTZ & MADIGAN, supra note 3, at 19 (“Patent pendency statistics are a strong indicator of
how serious a country is about supporting its own entrepreneurs.”).
34 Id.
35 Gene Quinn, Perspective of an Anonymous Patent Examiner, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/03/16/prespective-of-an-anonymous-patent-examiner/id=2190/
[https://perma.cc/43BS-HJ58].
36 Id.; Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 555.
31
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USPTO’s overall grant rate would fall 20%.37 Examiner tenure at the Patent
Office and examiner grant rates are directly related, despite more
experienced examiners receiving the same or more technically proficient
applications, suggesting an independent variable unrelated to application
quality may have staggering effects on patentability.38
Financially, however, the backlog has far greater impact on the
financial viability of the patent-seeking entity. In avoidance of entities losing
significant portions of their terms to prosecution pendency, the Patent Term
Adjustment (PTA) statute, 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(C), allows for Type A and
Type B delay awards when, for example, the USPTO takes more than four
months after the Request for Continued Examination (RCE) is filed to act on
the application.39 However, § 154(b)(2)(C) further provides for a deduction
from any PTA award “equal to the period of time during which the applicant
failed to engage in reasonable efforts to conclude prosecution of the
application.”40 Thus, the tension between applicant failure and USPTO delay
must be weighed such that applicants are not disgorged of patent exclusivity
due to backlog.
The costs of patents are substantial. Inventors pay for filing, cede their
disclosure to the public, and wait years for issuance. What, exactly, do they
get in return?
II. MEASURING PATENT QUALITY
The USPTO invests significant resources (nearly $2.8 billion in 2016)
to further its published “Goal I” of “optimizing patent quality and
timeliness.”41 While the constitutionally codified goal of the patent system is
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”42 the USPTO has
distilled that broad heading into three aspects to further that objective: “(1)
examining all of the patent applications prior to issuing patents, (2) issuing
only high quality, valid patents, and (3) treating all inventors and
technologies equally.”43 Specifically, the USPTO instituted the Patent
Examiner Technical Training Program “aimed at encouraging innovation
and strengthening the quality and accessibility of the patent system.”44 Patent
37

Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 1, at 560.
Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, 94
REV. ECON. STAT. 817, 826 (2012).
39 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(1)(A) (2015).
40 See id. § 154(b)(2)(C); Reduction of Period of Adjustment of Patent Term, 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c).
41 P ERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 121.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43 Lily J. Ackerman, Prioritization: Addressing the Patent Application Backlog at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 68 (2011).
44 P ERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 174.
38
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quality indisputably means something different to the agency than to an
applicant, and perhaps to an individual inventor than to a larger entity.
The valuation of a patent is necessarily multifaceted, such that if the
private value of a patent allows incorporation of variables beyond those
considered in the simple view of disclosure and exclusivity, “then we need
to reconsider the simple view’s implication that legal rules tend to underreward invention because appropriability is imperfect.”45 The enumeration
of patent quality must necessarily be considered through the market value,
signal, reputational, and impact considerations to be complete.
A. The Market Value Consideration
Patent worth may well be modeled by the economic value connoted by
those patent-sanctioned exclusivities. In considering the landscape of
patented products, economists consider the raw worth of patented products
comprising the “brokered patent market” to be a fluctuating landscape in
which “the only constant appears to be change.”46 In 2016, the value of the
brokered patent market was $165 million and the entire market $11 billion,
both of which change considerably year-over-year.47 That $11 billion of
intellectual property is spread across more than 3,500 packages, comprising
over 86,000 assets.48 Through assignment data, experts estimate that $2.3
billion of that market has sold, a number that likely underestimates the total
sales as not all assignments are recorded.49 Intellectual property, brokered or
otherwise, changes hands constantly in the United States and to significant
financial effect.
More specifically, the average asking price per asset by technology
group includes $235,000 for software and $193,000 for communications,
with a market average of $197,320 per asset.50 For U.S.-issued assets, that
market average was $271,440.51 These sales figures also lend some validity,
outside market value, to protecting patents through litigation. Of the
collections of IP assets sold on the market (comprising a package), 10.2%
have at least one U.S. patent litigated after the listing date.52 “[O]n a per-U.S.
patent basis, about 1.2% of U.S. patents presented are litigated.”53 Thus,

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Long, supra note 8, at 635.
Kent Richardson et. al., Inside the 2016 Brokered Patent Market, IAM, Jan./Feb. 2017, at 34.
Id.
Id. at 34–35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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patents have considerable monetary worth, here termed the “value
consideration,” which can be degraded by insufficient examination and by
pendency at the examining office.
Implicit are two points: the quality of patents issued by the USPTO
necessarily is imperfect (that is, the fact that claims are litigated, even if
many are found to be valid, means the USPTO is frequently issuing invalid
patents), and the cost of those litigations must be considered in the value, and
thus quality, of the patent grant.
To the first point, litigation before the PTAB suggests that patents
issued are far from perfect, with some patentability challenges showing
greater than 50% reversal rates, including Section 102 and 112 rejections.54
If there exists a certain amount of necessary time for prosecuting a patent
and any means undercuting that time will compromise patent quality
regarding its judicial validity, then judicial workload will necessarily
increase with any decrease in pendency below the quality-pendency
threshold marker.
Specifically, challenges for § 112(a) issues (deficient written
description, enablement) have an overall 52% chance of reversal considering
both PTAB and appellate decisions; § 112(b) (indefiniteness) has a 48%
chance; § 102 (novelty), 57% for at least one claim and 49% across all
claims; and § 103 (obviousness), 43% on one claim and 34% across all
claims.55 PTAB and Federal Circuit reversals are, in theory, direct notations
of USPTO quality failures—decisions in which a judicial entity overrules the
Patent Office in determining the validity of a previously issued patent.56
Here the patent-value-matrix widens as additional considerations exist
in litigation-validity outcomes: while pharmaceutical and medical patents
are more likely than not to be upheld, the majority of computer and
communication-based technology patents are overturned.57 Additionally,
“the age of a patent seems to be an important predictor of validity—pre-1990
approvals are much more likely to be upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (‘CAFC’) than post-1990 approvals.”58 Patents are
frequently and expensively litigated; improper examination and issuance of
invalid claims can significantly diminish their value consideration.
54 Update on ex parte PTAB Appeals Reversal Rates: High Reversal Rates Maintained Except for
101 – Nonstatutory Rejections, ANTICIPAT BLOG (Aug. 23, 2017), https://blog.anticipat.com/2017/08/23/
update-on-ex-parte-ptab-appeals-reversal-rates-high-reversal-rates-maintained-except-for-101nonstatutory-rejections/ [https://perma.cc/3S8L-ZNTW].
55 Id.
56 Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of
Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1042–43 (1998).
57 Cockburn et al., supra note 1, at 45–46.
58 Id. at 46.
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B. The Signal Consideration
To more fully understand the worth of patents in the United States, the
scope must be further broadened. Scholars argue that patents retain value
from their ability to act as signals: Clarisa Long of Columbia Law School
rejects the “simple view” of intellectual property rights, and instead looks at
patents as signals.59 Specifically, she writes:
[Patent portfolios] can indicate what lines of research the firm is undertaking
and what the firm does and doesn’t consider valuable, outline a research
trajectory that adumbrates fields the firm may be branching into next, disclose
how fast the firm is proceeding within a particular area of research, and reveal
other valuable dynamic information. 60

This view incorporates a bird’s-eye view of the patentscape, wherein
the value of intellectual property is determined not only by what it can fetch
on the open market but by what the IP means for the process of innovation
and creation in the same space.
Signals further serve to supplement the value lost from any financial
delays. Because patents are published at eighteen months from filing,
regardless of validity, an entire facet of the patent’s worth is necessarily
staged such that the Patent Office delay is irrelevant: the signal will occur at
publication, regardless of when the patent issues. Thus, if patents are valued
not only for their economic worth but also for their signaling ability, the twoyear slog to issuance is, at least partially, mitigated.
Beyond the signaling value of the application itself, patents can act as
signals for the firm at large. To that end, “[if] patents are correlated with less
readily observable firm characteristics,” they can serve as a signal of firm
quality.61 Put alternately, the quality of the patent is independent of the
pendency before the USPTO when taken broadly to incorporate the patent’s
function as an indicium of what the firm is doing and where its research and
development processes lie. Specifically, a patent may “reduce the cost of
communicating private information to the market regarding the financial
prospects of the firm,” potentially increasing the patent’s signatory value.62
Under signal theory, then, the USPTO may increase patent worth simply by
decreasing the requisite time to publication or allowing further signal
capacities outside of the examination.
To only value a patent’s disclosure is to fail to see the entire picture.
That is, if the “value of a patent is composed of additional variables that the
59
60
61
62

Long, supra note 8, at 635, 646-48.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 637.
Id.
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simple view does not consider, then it may be rational to seek patent rights
even when the expected cost of the rights is greater than the expected but-for
rents.”63 It is thus likely that there exists a variable that is unaffected by the
pendency before the PTO, and dictated solely by the patent’s ability to signal
the publication requirement. For some applications, this signaling value to
the patentee may manifest as “extra capital [the applicant] is able to raise in
capital markets because of the information conveyed by the patent.”64
Still, additional patent-economic theories support the approach that
disclosure, and not the issued patent grant, is the marker of quality—and
thus, the time lag before the Patent Office hardly detracts from value.65 Under
disclosure theory, patents are not presumed necessary to spur innovation.66
Rather, inventors will solve the problems that arise from the non-rivalrous,
non-excludable nature of ideas by maintaining secrecy over their
inventions.67 That is, applicants are not incentivized by patents to invest their
resources into new innovations, but once these innovations occur they are
incentivized to disclose.
If signal theory is allowed to stand beside the monetary value of a
patent, the quality and worth of the application becomes far more complex
and inclusive. In some ways, the pendency before the Patent Office is
negated by the mandatory publication date at eighteen months.68 That is, “[i]f
inventors might gain from publicizing information in a patent, then they may
choose to seek patent protection, even if the anticipated value of the
exclusive rights received in return were zero.”69 Undoubtedly, if pendency
dissuades inventors from filing patent applications, then the value and
quality decreases.70 But the Patent Office has a long history of accepting
more filings than the year before.71 While the backlog remains, and time to
issuance stays over the two-year hurdle, the mandatory publication date may
salvage significant worth from the application.
C. The Impact Value
Beyond the monetary and signaling values of a patent, there are inherent
qualities in an application that factor into the patent’s overall worth. An
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Intellectual Asset Management and Santa Clara study led by Chien and
Kesan investigated the differences in perceived quality metrics between the
USPTO and the EPO.72 The EPO ranked above its U.S. counterpart in
consistency, predictability, search, evaluation of obviousness, consideration
of Non-Patent Literature, evaluation of specification, and adequate time.73
Meanwhile, the USPTO ranked ahead of the EPO in customer service, cost,
and timeliness.74
A major outcome of this—and a detriment to the quality of patents—is
the variability in the scope of claims allowed. A common metric in patent
quality—and one most readily quantifiable—is the number of citations it
receives in other patent applications.75 Here too, human error resides.
Functionally, “examiners who tend to allow broader claims will impinge on
a greater number of follow-on inventions and therefore receive more
citations over time.”76 Thus frequent markers of quality are dependent on the
skill and prosecution style of the particular examiner (that is, “prior research
has emphasized the degree to which the number of citations received by a
patent is an indicator of its underlying inventive significance”).77 Inventions
bringing paradigm shifts and often those with scarce prior art are most
heavily cited. But, as Iain Cockburn admits, “[c]itations may also reflect the
quality or scope of the disclosure accompanying the claims.”78
Like the reputational value, the impact value of a patent is directly
related to the pendency period and thus hampered by an inefficient Patent
Office. Most notably, patents are driven by citation metrics, such that a wellcited patent is considered to be a stronger (and more valuable) one. Such
strength is reduced proportionally when a patent has less time to garner
citations. The effects are undoubtedly alleviated by the publication at
eighteen months (as with signaling), but in the absence of an issued patent,
the impact value is tempered by pendency.
D. The Reputational Value
Of course, any patent office has a vested interest in insuring issuance of
high-quality patents; both its reputation, and the stability of the patent market
72
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are theoretically at stake.79 Specifically, when firms file and receive patent
rights there exists some expectation that the grant confers exclusivity to the
patentee. As described by Long, “issuance of a patent stands for the
proposition that the PTO has reviewed the information contained in a patent
and declared that it describes something new, useful, and nonobvious.”80 The
USPTO has strong reputational pressure to continue to issue sound, valid,
and reasonably litigation-proof patents to propagate the patent system in the
United States.
Reputational value is outfitted in the interplay between USPTO
examiners and the patents they issue. The possibility exists that “USPTO
patent examination procedures do allow for significant differences across
examiners in the nature and scope of patent rights that are granted,” a finding
that “points to an important role for litigation and judicial review in checking
the impact of discretion and specialization in the patent examination
process.”81 Given the variability of issuance before the USPTO, there are “as
many patent offices as there are patent examiners,” further prompting the
question of whether the significant pendency period is due to more thorough
investigation or simply slow examiner action.82 Thus, a significant
determinant of issuance—and thus a determinant of the quality of patents
outputted by the USPTO—is dependent on the individual examiner. If patent
worth is significantly variable depending on the examiner in the current state,
the USPTO must move for conformity to ease judicial burden, but also to
preserve their reputation as distributers of constitutionally-protected
material.
Finally, reputational value comes to investors simply in the form of a
“patent pending” moniker applicable to their invention. Functioning as
something separate from the patent as a signal, the patent pending
denomination is cosmetic and may serve notice to competitors that the
investor’s product is, at least potentially, novel and patentable.83
The reputational considerations—the most relevant metrics for the
Patent Office considered in this study, and the most directly tied to USPTO
performance—are directly tied to pendency. That is, the reputational value
of a patent is stronger when the Patent Office is more efficient and more
correct—inclusive of both pendency and validity (i.e. strength) of patents
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issued. That said, reputational values are the least substantial in the overall
worth of a patent. The monetary, signaling, and impact considerations add
more to a patent’s net value, and the pendency effects here—while existent—
are not substantial.
These four considerations—market, signal, impact, and reputational
value—are all derived from the quality of a patent. But not all four are
harmed by the pendency before the USPTO and, in the case of signaling,
may actually benefit from it.

Patent Worth
Consideration
Market Value
Signal
Impact
Reputational

Direct Authority

Relative Harm by
Pendency [Rank]
1
4
3

Inventor-Applicant
Market-at-Large
Investor-Applicant;
Market-at-Large
Institution (USPTO) 2

III. MODULATING QUALITY BEYOND PENDENCY
An obvious, if imperfect, initiate to decrease the lengthy wait at the
USPTO is to hire and train more examiners so that each examiner has a
decreased workload, less top-down pressures, and the opportunity to give
each application a more thorough investigation.84 But even increasing the
staff of examiners could prove to be a stopgap solution if the number of
applications filed annually continues to rise.85
Thus, if the pendency issue is considered an insurmountable one—if the
backlog of patents and quality variance of examiners suggests that the
pendency will never be significantly decreased to make up for the signaldisclosure paradox set forth above—perhaps patent quality can be modulated
in other ways. Facilitation of an expedited patent prosecution process can be
modulated in three ways: reduced cost, the (already implemented) Patent
Prosecution Highway, and the publication of a search report. Each may slash
at the pendency before the USPTO, but a published search report, similar to
what is found in the EPO, would allow examiners to focus their time more
specifically on the search component before delving into the validity (i.e.
examination) component of the patent.86 This would allow examiners more
time to understand complicated art units and determine relevant prior art in
84
85
86
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a detached setting from the validity at hand, enabling prosecution with higher
fidelity.
A. Cost
One means to diminish pendency is cost. The financial barrier to entry
before the EPO is higher than that before the USPTO, and EPO pendency is
shorter. Specifically, the EPO requires a search fee of €1,300 (about $1,500)
with examination and designation fees added to sum to just under €3,000.87
Additionally, the EPO requires renewal fees post-issuance of €470 beginning
in the third year of the term.88 At the USPTO, the application fee is a
comparable $1,600, but the combined application and issue fee is just $2,560
with renewal fees due at 3.5 years post-issuance.89 That’s not to belittle the
total expense; indeed, a conservative estimate is that applicants spent about
$7.5 billion pursuing patents in 2012—dwarfing the approximately $1.4
billion the USPTO spent examining applications the same year.90
“Pricing out” frivolous applications by increasing the filing and
examining cost could have the unwanted effect of dissuading junior and
smaller inventors from filing due to economic constraints.91 Fortunately, the
USPTO already incentivizes smaller inventors through decreased pricing
structures, including 50% and 75% fee reductions, depending on the size and
income of the filing inventor or entity.92 A sliding-scale pricing model, in
which application fees are adjusted based upon technology group, novelty
(by number of citations) and inventor-size, may facilitate a protocol by which
the USPTO can price-out frivolous applications without deterring serious
applicants.
There are additional, extensive considerations in the cost-prosecution
matrix that may indeed filter filed claims such that applicants are already
motivated to file only claims at a certain threshold validity. Such an
explanation, as put forth by Stephen Yelderman at Harvard Law School, may
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counter the idea that cost could have a determinative effect on pendency.93
That is, if claims are already filtered ex ante based on their relative validity
in terms of their cost, then upping the costs to file or prosecute at the USPTO
would seemingly “knock out” only preselected, valid claims.94 Yelderman
writes that:
Although applicants have the option of filing a theoretically unlimited number
of claims, not every conceivable claim is necessarily worth filing. . . . Given
these incremental expenses, applicants will rationally seek to avoid filing claims
that have an expected value that is less than the expected marginal cost to obtain
them.95

There is, then, a floor beneath which claim value is insufficient to
justify filing.96 While raising this floor could, in Yelderman’s considerations,
decrease the number of filings—and resultantly the pendency period—it
would likely decrease the quantity of good patents and run counter to USPTO
prerogative.97
B. Patent Prosecution Highway
A second measure taken by the USPTO to decrease pendency is the
institution of the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), a joint program with
other major patent offices worldwide that was founded on the theory that a
valid patent in one jurisdiction should have an accelerated track to issuance
in another.98 The PPH provides a means to facilitate expedited prosecution
in a partnering country given allowance in another.99 Resultantly, PPH
applications before the USPTO were issued in 84% of cases, compared to

93 See generally Yelderman, supra note 90 (positing an alternative approach to low-quality patents
by looking at patent quality from an applicant’s perspective and evaluating how certain patent rules might
be encouraging inventors to file higher or lower quality claims).
94 See id. (proposing that improving patent quality may be a function of increasing the costs to file
an application while reducing the benefits of low-quality claims such that applicants are discouraged from
filing frivolous claim sets).
95 Id. at 92.
96 Id. at 113–14 (“[T]he cost of filing a claim can serve as an important backstop that may screen
against some of the lowest-value claims. . . . Without some cost constraint, there would be no reason to
avoid filing extremely broad or extremely narrow claims, since there is always a chance that one of those
claims might turn out to be valuable.”).
97 Id. at 93.
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53% for non-PPH applications.100 While accelerated prosecution does not
include a legal presumption of validity, it does allow an officer of the later
examining office to reuse search and examination materials to more quickly
and efficiently pursue the application.101
Here, the pendency versus quality dichotomy could not be more
apparent; because PPH applications have already been examined by a foreign
patent office, they may arrive before the USPTO with claims significantly
narrower than an unexamined application sent directly. While this narrower
scope increases the probability of patentability, it also means that unclaimed
material may be “left on the table,” inaccessible to a PPH applicant.
Additionally, and in spite of a PPH application being placed on a USPTO
examiner’s “special” docket, examination times can vary markedly based on
the number of other matters on the docket. Thus, though prosecution times
under the PPH are generally faster, they are likely due to prosecution
beginning earlier, not the simplified process provided by an alreadyexamined application.102
While the PPH allows for marginal increases in speed before the
USPTO, the same is not true for PPH applications submitted to the EPO.103
That is, “anecdotal evidence suggests that PPH applications at the EPO
actually have lower rates of allowance and longer pendencies than the
average.”104 Of course, the nature of slower and less-patentable subject
matter moving from the USPTO to the EPO is not directly due to examinerexaminer comparisons; rather, the EPO mandates its own substantive search
and examination procedures be applied to incoming PPH applications
“irrespective of the application’s prosecution and granting in another
country.”105
And while the EPO currently provides no data on PPH applications
other than the number of applications filed, there is no available data
available suggesting that PPH applications at the EPO show any substantive
improvement in speed or outcome, hampering the feasibility of major
improvements to the USPTO from PPH expansion.106
100 Gene Quinn, PPH at the USPTO: Following the Patent Prosecution Highway for a Smooth Ride,
IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/26/pph-uspto-patentprosecution-highway/id=76004/ [https://perma.cc/JWZ2-G67B].
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102 Martin D. Hayden et. al, IP5 PPH Pilot Program, FINNEGAN: INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY TODAY,
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/ip5-pph-pilot-program.html?news=18e8dcb7-884f-4d63-ae3012f3ecaecff8 [https://perma.cc/HA5B-UWZP].
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.

206

16:189 (2019)

The Waiting is the Hardest Part

C. Search Report
A potential implementation to deter low-quality patents (and thus
reduce the backlog of patents awaiting prosecution) would be
implementation of a search report similar to what is requisite in the European
Patent Office. Publication of a search report would likely increase the
withdrawal rate from the USPTO and place it more on par with the EPO
where withdrawals rather than rejections make up the majority of all nongranted European patent applications.107 Implementation of such a
commitment step for inventors would create a sufficient barrier to entry to
decrease frivolous (or simply nonviable) applications from being filed.
A search report would allow examiners to focus their time more
specifically on the search component before delving into the validity
component, again mirroring what happens at the EPO.108 Studies have found
that two-thirds of USPTO examiners believe they have somewhat less or
much less time than needed to complete a thorough prior art search—
something they were allowed under former Director David Kappos.109
It is unclear that requisite search reports and bifurcating the search and
examination proceedings would significantly decrease the PTO workload in
the absence of other structural changes. Considering the newly-filed
application-to-examiner ratio at the EPO is roughly half that of the USPTO
(37.85 (160,000 applications:4227 examiners) compared to the USPTO’s
73.62 (600,000:8150)), the USPTO would need more drastic measures than
simple search report publication to cut pendency by a significant margin.110
A combination of the three options, if implemented today—a reduced
cost, an option to ride the Patent Prosecution Highway, and the publication
of a search report—may streamline the USPTO sufficiently to make
significant progress on decreasing pendency. But in a climate where big
changes are scarce—and budgetary concerns dictate policy—even the
implementation of a published prior art search report before an examiner
conducts the application’s validity examination would constitute significant
inroads towards a more efficient patent system in the United States.
IV. CONCLUSION
Part I of this paper looked at the patent office function and the factors
that feed into pendency—from application backlog, improver examiner
incentives, and an influx of applications. Part II considered the value-quality-
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worth dynamics of a patent and how pendency—while depriving applicants
of raw financial gain—may not inhibit a patent from being valuable. Part III
sought potential improvements to the patent system in the United States.
If patents are considered to have “quality” only if they are (a) valid and
(b) litigation-proof, then the USPTO is not doing its job. But instead, if the
quality-value-worth matrix is widened via the introduction of patent
signaling, reputation, or minor, readily implementable tweaks to the Patent
Office, patents have value beyond any monetary considerations and the
pendency consideration is not a significant detriment to filing.

208

